BOOK II CHAPTER VI Of the Right of Private Judgment Foundation of virtue. - Human actions regulated: 1, by the nature of things. - 2, by positive institution. - Tendency of the latter: 1, to excite virtue. - Its equivocal character in this respect. - 2, to inform the judgment. - Its inaptitude for that purpose. - Province of conscience considered. - Tendency of an interference with that province.- Unsuitableness of punishment - either to impress new sentiments -- or to strengthen old ones. - Recapitulation. IT has appeared, that the most essential of those rights which constitute the peculiar sphere appropriate to each individual, and the right upon which every other depends as its basis, is the right of private judgment. It will therefore be of use to say something distinctly on this head. To a rational being there can be but one rule of conduct, justice; and one mode of ascertaining that...
With an Introduction by James J. Martin Introduction In reissuing this famous but long-neglected work for the first time in over a century, it is not intended that it furnish a pretext to leap into the complex controversy concerning "women's rights" which has become increasingly intensified in the last fifteen years. The object is rather to bring attention to an undeservedly obscured figure in American intellectual and ideological history, first of all, and to put on the contemporary record one of the overlooked phases of the struggle to achieve equality before the law, especially, for women in the USA. It has been observed that it has become progressively more difficult to write about any phase of this subject recently, as the language of ... (From : crispinsartwell.com.)