11. Conclusions and Concluding Note

The Friends of Durruti Group was an affinity group, like many another existing in anarcho-syndicalist quarters. It was not influenced to any extent by the Trotskyists, nor by the POUM. Its ideology and watchwords were quintessentially in the CNT idiom: it cannot be said that they displayed a marxist ideology at any time. In any event, they displayed great interest in the example of Marat during the French Revolution, and it may be feasible to speak of their having been powerfully attracted by the assemblyist movement of the Parisian sections, by the sans-culottes, the Enrages and the revolutionary government of Robespierre and Saint-Just.

Their objective was nothing less than to tackle the CNT’s contradictions, afford it an ideological coherence and wrest it from the control of its personalities and responsible committees in order to return it to its class struggle roots. The Group had been set up to criticize and oppose the CNT’s policy of concession after concession,[145] and of course the collaboration of anarcho-syndicalists in the central and Generalidad governments. They were against the abandonment of revolutionary objectives and of anarchism’s fundamental and quintessential ideological principles, which the CNT-FAI leaders had thrown over in favor of antifascist unity and the need to adapt to circumstances. Without revolutionary theory there is no revolution. If principles were good for nothing other than to be discarded at the first hurdle erected by reality, it might be better to acknowledge that we have no principles. The top leaders of Spanish anarcho-syndicalism imagined themselves skillful negotiators, but they were manipulated like so many puppets.[146] They forswore everything and in return got ... nothing. These were opportunists without opportunity. The uprising of July 19 had no revolutionary party capable of taking power and making revolution. The CNT had never considered what was to be done once the army mutineers had been defeated. The July victory plunged the anarcho-syndicalist leaders into bewilderment and confusion. They had been overtaken by the masses’ revolutionary dynamism. And, not knowing what to do next, they agreed to Companys’s suggestion that they set up a Popular Front government in conjunction with the other parties. And they posited a phony dilemma between anarchist dictatorship or antifascist unity and collaboration with the State for the purposes of winning the war. They had no idea what to do with power, when the failure to take it resulted in its falling into the bourgeoisie’s hands. The Spanish revolution was the tomb of anarchism as a revolutionary theory of the proletariat. Such was the origin and motivation behind the Friends of Durruti Group.

However, the Group’s boundaries were very plain and well-defined. As were its limitations, too. At no time did they contemplate a break with the CNT. Only utter ignorance of the organizational mechanics of the CNT could lead us to imagine that it was possible to carry out critical or schismatic activity that would not lead to expulsion. In the case of the Friends of Durruti, expulsion was averted thanks to the sympathies they enjoyed among the CNT rank and file membership, albeit at the cost of severe ostracism and near absolute isolation.

The ultimate aim of the Group was to criticize the CNT leaders and to end the policy of CNT participation in government. They sought not only to preserve the “gains” of July but to prosecute and pursue the process of revolution. But their means and their organization were still extremely limited. They were barricade-fighters, not good organizers and indeed were worse theorists, although they did have some good journalists. In May they trusted entirely to the masses’ spontaneity. They failed to counter official CNT propaganda. They neither used nor organized militants who were members of the Control Patrols. They issued no instructions to Máximo Franco, a Friends of Durruti member, a delegate of the CNT’s Rojinegra Division, which attempted to “go down to Barcelona” on May 4, 1937, only to return to the front (as did the POUM column led by Rovira) following overtures made to it by Molina.[147] The high point of their activities was the poster distributed in late April 1937, in which the overthrow of the Generalidad government and its replacement by a Revolutionary Junta was urged: control of several barricades in the Ramblas during the May events: the reading of a call, addressed to all Europe’s workers,[148] for solidarity with the Spanish revolution: distribution around the barricades of the famous May 5^th handbill: and the assessment of the May days in the manifesto of May 8^th. But they were unable to put these slogans into practice. They suggested the formation of a column to go out and head off troops coming from Valencia: but they soon abandoned the idea in view of the cool reception received by the proposal. After the May events they began publication of El Amigo del Pueblo, although they had been disowned by the CNT and the FAI. In June 1937, although they had not been outlawed as the POUM had, they suffered the political persecution that hit the rest of the CNT’s membership. Their mouthpiece El Amigo del Pueblo was published clandestinely from issue No. 2 (May 26) onwards, and its managing editor Jaime Balius endured a series of jail terms. Other Friends of Durruti members lost their posts or their influence, like Bruno Lladó, a councilor on Sabadell city council. Most of the Durruti-ists had to endure FAI-sponsored attempts[149] to have them expelled from the CNT. In spite of all of which they carried on issuing their newspaper clandestinely and in mid-1938 they issued the pamphlet Hacia una nueva revolución, by which time the counterrevolution’s success had proved final and overwhelming and the republicans had already lost the war.

Their chief tactical proposals were summed up in the following slogans: trade union management of the economy, federation of municipalities, militia-based army, revolutionary program, replacement of the Generalidad by a Revolutionary Junta, concerted CNT-FAI-POUM action.

If we had to sum up the historical and political significance of the Friends of Durruti, we should say that it was the failed attempt, originating from within the bosom of the libertarian movement, to establish a revolutionary vanguard that would put paid to the CNT-FAI’s collaborationism and defend and develop the revolutionary “gains” of July.

The attempt was a failure because they showed themselves incapable, not just of putting their slogans into practice, but even of effectively disseminating their ideas and offering practical guide-lines for campaigning on behalf of them. The Group was constituted as an FAI affinity group. Perhaps the terror-stricken bourgeoisie and the disguised priest regarded them as savage beasts, but their numbers included journalists like Balius and Callejas, militia column commanders like Pablo Ruiz, Francisco Pellicer and Máximo Franco and councilors like Bruno Lladó. For their distant origins we have to go back to the libertarians who shared the revolutionary experience of the Upper Llobregat insurrection in January 1932 and to the FAI’s “Renacer” affinity group between 1934 and 1936. Their more immediate roots lay in the opposition to militarization of the militias (especially in the Gelsa sector and within the Iron Column) and in the defense of revolutionary gains and criticism of the CNT’s collaborationism as set out in articles published in Solidaridad Obrera (between July and early October 1936), in Ideasand La Noche (between January and May 1937), by Balius in particular. Their campaign weapons were the handbill, the poster, the newspaper and the barricade: but a split or rupture was never contemplated as a weapon, any more than exposure of the CNT’s counterrevolutionary role, or, during the May events at any rate, confronting the CNT leaders in an effort to counter the CNT-FAI’s defeatist counsels.

Yet the historical significance of the Friends of Durruti cannot be denied. And it resides precisely in their status as an internal opposition to the libertarian movement’s collaborationist policy. The political importance of their emergence was immediately detected by Nin, who devoted an approving, hopeful article to them,[150] on the grounds that they held out the prospect of the CNT masses’ espousing a revolutionary line and opposing the CNT’s policy of appeasement and collaboration.

Hence the interest which the POUM and Trotskyists[151] displayed in bringing the Friends of Durruti under their influence — something in which they never succeeded.

The main theoretical contributions of the Group to anarchist thinking can be summed up as these:

1. The need for a revolutionary program.

2. Replacement of the capitalist State by a Revolutionary Junta, which must stand by to defend the revolution from the inevitable attacks of counterrevolutionaries.

Anarchists’ traditional apoliticism meant that the CNT lacked a theory of revolution. In the absence of a theory, there is no revolution, and the failure to assume power meant that it was left in the hands of the capitalist State. In the estimation of the Friends of Durruti Group, the CAMC (Central Antifascist Militias Committee) was a class collaborationist agency, and served no purpose other than to prop up and reinforce the bourgeois State which it neither could nor wished to destroy. Hence the Friends’ advocacy of the need to set up a Revolutionary Junta, capable of coordinating, centralizing and reinforcing the power of the countless workers’, local, defense, factory, militians’ etc. committees, which alone held power between July 19 and September 26. This power was diffused through numerous committees, which held all power locally, but by failing to federate, centralize and reinforce one another, were channeled, whittled down and converted by the CAMC into Popular Front councils, into the management boards of unionized firms and the battalions of the Republican army. Without utter destruction of the capitalist State, the revolutionary events of July 1936 could not have opened the way to a new structure of workers’ power. The decline and ultimate demise of the revolutionary process was inevitable. However, the tension between the CNT-FAI’s reformist anarchism and the Friends of Durruti’s revolutionary anarchism was not plain and stark enough to provoke a split which would have clarified the contrasting stances of them both.

So, although the political thinking set out by the Friends of Durruti was an attempt to accommodate the reality of the war and revolution in Spain within anarcho-syndicalist ideology, one of the primary grounds on which it was rejected by the CNT membership was its authoritarian, “marxist” or “Bolshevistic” flavor. From which we may conclude that the Friends of Durruti were trapped in a cul de sac. They could not embrace the collaborationism of the CNT’s leadership cadres and the progress of the counterrevolution: but when they theorized about the experiences of the Spanish revolution, that is, concluded that there was a need for a Revolutionary Junta to overthrow the bourgeois republican government of the Generalidad of Catalonia and use force to repress the agents of the counterrevolution, they were dubbed marxists and authoritarians,[152] and thereby lost any chance they might have had of making recruits from among the CNT rank and file. We have to wonder if the Friends of Durruti’s dilemma was not merely a reflection of Spanish anarcho-syndicalism’s theoretical inability to face up to the problems posed by the war and the revolution.

We cannot wind up this study without a concluding note expressing our political repugnance and our repudiation, in our capacity as readers of history, of those who, hiding behind their alleged academic objectivity,[153] dare to defame, judge, condemn, insult and hold up to ridicule persons and organizations from the workers’ movement — all from a bourgeois standpoint, which they of course consider to be scientific and impartial, although they may have utilized no methodology other than misrepresentation of the facts and the most asinine nonsense.

There may be those who take the line that the criticisms articulated here of the Friends of Durruti’s and the CNT’s political stances have, on occasion, been very harsh: we shall be satisfied if they are also regarded as rigorous and class-based, and our response will be that the repression that the defeat of the proletariat brought in its wake was even harsher.

Balius was not the crippled, bloodthirsty ogre as which the terror of the bourgeois and the cleric depicted him in 1937: or as he is represented today by the “comic books” from the Catalanist publishing house of the Benedictines of Montserrat, and/or the unwarranted hogwash from quite a few academic historians. Balius was a modest, intelligent, honest person, a coherent and intransigent and extremely commonsensical revolutionary. But even if Balius had been — as he was not — the demon as which the terrified clergy and bourgeoisie imagined him, that would not have altered our assessment of the Friends of Durruti one iota. Precisely because we have acknowledged, analyzed and repeatedly emphasized in this work the limitations of the band of revolutionaries known as the Friends of Durruti Group, we cannot close without paying tribute to the memory of a working class organization which embodied the proletariat’s class consciousness and which strove, at a given point, and with a full complement of limitations and shortcomings, to fill the role of a revolutionary vanguard.

In Barcelona it was and still is possible to overhear expressions of hatred and contempt relating to Durruti and “his friends” coming from the lips of the class enemy: however, in working class circles, the mythic Durruti, the huge proletarian demonstration at his funeral, the indomitable rebelliousness of the Durruti-ists, and the revolutionary anarchist feats of July 19 have always been spoken of with respect. During the long night of Francoism, anonymous hands scrawled the names on the unmarked graves of Durruti and Ascaso. It is not the task of the historian to respect myth: but it is the task of the historian to confront defamation, misrepresentation and insult when they pass themselves off as historical narrative.

And although we tackle that thankless task, we prefer to draw the lessons that matter to the class struggle. It should be enough to bear two pictures in mind. In the first, we see a humble, persuasive, loquacious Companys on July 21 , offering to make room for anarchist leaders in an Antifascist Front government, on the grounds that they had routed the military fascists and power was in the streets. In the second, we see a brazen, cornered Companys beseeching the Republican government on May 4 to order the air force to bomb the CNT’s premises. The film of the revolution and the war is running between these two pictures.

May 1937 was incubated in July 1936. The Friends of Durruti Group had realized that revolutions are totalitarian or are defeated: therein lies its great merit.

**

[1] Writing in Ideas (Bajo Llobregat) No 24, June 17, 1937, p. 4.

[2] Ernesto Bonomini wrote an eyewitness account of the May events in Barcelona for Volonta No 11, May 1, 1947.

[3] El Amigo del Pueblo No 4, June 22, 1937, p. 3, “El asalto a la Telefónica”.

[4] Spanish anarchism was more comfortable with radical contrasts than with the blurred edges created by, say, the antifascist umbrella, or, earlier, republican ralliement. “We Spanish anarcho-syndicalists were faithful to the dialectical principle to the very end. Liberal or reformist government we made an especial target of our spleen, out of a secret feeling of competition. We would rather unemployment lines than unemployment benefit. Given a choice between enslavement to bosses and cooperativism, we preferred the former. And emphatically rejected the latter.” — José Peirats Examen criticoconstructivo del Movimiento Libertario Español (Editores Mexicanos Unidos, Mexico DF, 1967) p. 42.

[5] Ideas No 4, January 21, 1937, p. 4.

[6] Ruta (Barcelona) No 13, January 7, 1937, p. 6, “Centralismo.”

[7] Boldly displayed on the front page of El Amigo del Pueblo No 2, May 26, 1937, was this item: “We are against any armistice. The blood shed by Spanish workers is an impregnable bulwark upon which the intrigues sponsored by homegrown politicians and capitalist diplomats around the world will founder. Victory or death. There is no other solution.” Similar defiance of suspected intrigues designed to bring about a diplomatic resolution of the war and taking things out of the hands of Spanish workers featured in Ideas, Ruta and other papers also.

[8] José Peirats La CNT en la revolución española (Ed. Madre Tierra, Madrid, 1988, Vol. 11, p. 220) citing a CNT National Committee resume of the accords reached at a national plenum of regionals meeting on May 23, 1937.

[9] El Amigo del Pueblo No 2, 26 May 1937, p. 3. The Friends pointedly added:
“Whenever, in contravention of every confederal precept, someone goes over the heads of assemblies and militants and sets himself up as a general, making mistake after mistake, he has no option, assuming he has any shred of dignity left, but to set down. Garcia Oliver fits that bill!”

[10] El Amigo del Pueblo No 8, September 21, 1937, p. 2. “The admission of Pestana sets the seal upon the bourgeois democratic mentality in a broad swathe of confederal circles. Watch out, comrades.”

[11] El Amigo del Pueblo No 4, June 22, 1937, p. 3, “En defensa propia: Necesito una aclaración.” “I am aghast at countless instances of my being labeled a marxist, because I am 100 percent a revolutionary.” This comment suggests that Balius regarded marxists as being something short of 100 percent revolutionaries, although the Friends were generous enough to recognize that the POUM had acquitted itself well in the street-fighting in Barcelona in May 1937. This rejection of marxism would have applied not to the marxian analysis of capitalist economics, but to the marxist recipe for changing society, not to the descriptive but to the prescriptive element.

[12] José Peirats La CNT en la revolución española Vol 11, p. 147. Peirats reproduces a text which opens “A Revolutionary Junta has been formed [emphasis added] in Barcelona.” César M. Lorenzo reproduces this text given by Peirats. But the Peirats text is not a quotation but a mistaken paraphrase.

[13] César M. Lorenzo Los anarquistas espanoles y el poder (Ruedo Iberico, Paris, 1972) p. 219, n. 32.

[14] The full text of the leaflet from which Lorenzo quotes can be found in Henri Chaze Chronique de la revolution espagnole: Union Communiste (1933–1939) (Paris, Cahiers Spartacus, 1979) pp. 114–115. Juan Gómez Casas Anarchist Organization: The History of the FAI (Black Rose Books, Montreal-Buffalo, 1986, p. 210) uncritically reproduces Lorenzo’s curious footnote as if it were a Friends of Durruti text.

[15] Henri Chaze, op. cit. p. 82 (from L’lnternationale No 33, December 18, 1937.

[16] Exasperation with their republican “allies” was widespread by the summer of 1937 and before. There were even embarrassed arguments about the ingenuousness of anarchists. “Let us make very plain the principle that we owe no loyalty to him who is disloyal with us: that we owe no respect to him who secretly betrays us, that we have no duty of tolerance to anyone disposed to coerce us just as soon as he is strong enough to do so and get away with it, that principle cannot oblige us to respect the freedom of him whose principle is to take away our freedom” (Beobachter, in Ideas No 29, August 6, 1937).

[17] Susana Tavera and Enric Ucelay Da Cal “Grupos de afinidad, disciplina bélica y periodismo libertario 1936–1938” in Historia Contemporanea, 9, (Servicio Ed. Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1993) pp. 184.

[18] The most important studies of the Friends of Durruti Group are: Francisco Manuel Aranda: “Les amis de Durruti” in Cahiers Leon Trotsky No. 10 (1982); Jordi Arquer: Història de la fundació i actuació de la “Agrupación Amigos de Durruti” Unpublished; Georges Fontenis: Le message révolutionnaire des “Amis de Durruti” (Editions L, Paris, 1983); Frank Mintz and Manuel Peciña: Los Amigos de Durruti, los trotsquistas y los sucesos de mayo (Campo Abierto, Madrid, 1978); Paul Sharkey: The Friends of Durruti: A Chronology (Editorial Crisol, Tokyo, May 1984)

[19] According to an affidavit by Jaume Anton Aiguadér, nephew of Artemi Aiguadér, signed in the presence of witnesses in Mexico City on August 9, 1946: “At the time of the May events, the Generalidad government asked for aircraft from Spain in order to bomb the CNT buildings and the latter refused the request.” This statement is borne out by the teletype messages exchanged between Companys and the central government. In those messages, on Tuesday, May 4, 1937, the Generalidad President informed the cabinet under-secretary that the rebels had brought artillery out on to the streets, and he asked that Lieutenant-Colonel Felipe Diaz Sandino, commander of the Prat de Lllobregat military air base, be instructed to place himself at the disposal of the Generalidad government: “Generalidad President informs cabinet under-secretary that rebels have brought cannons on to streets. Asks that Sandino be ordered place himself disposal of Generalidad government.” [Documentation on deposit in the Hoover Institution.]

[20] According to the testimony of Diego Abad de Santillán.

[21] See Garcia Oliver’s answers (which date from the first half of 1950) to a questionnaire from Burnett Bolloten [on deposit with the Hoover Institution]: “With regard to the February elections, the CNT-FAI adopted the following line, which was peddled throughout Spain at rallies as well as in writing. The forthcoming elections are going to be decisive for the Spanish people. If the working class votes for the left, the latter will take power, but we will have to confront an uprising by the military and the right aimed at seizing power. If the working class does not vote for the left, that would spell a lawful success for fascism. We for our part advise the working class to do as it pleases with regard to voting, but we say to it, that if it does not vote for the left, before six month will have elapsed from the later’s victory, we shall have to resist the fascist right with weapons in hand. Naturally, Spain’s working class, which had for many years been advised by the CNT not to vote, placed upon our propaganda the construction we wanted, which is to say, that it should vote, in that it would always be better to stand up to the fascist right, if they revolted, once defeated and out of government. The left won in the February 1936 elections. Companys became the government in Catalonia and the left became the government of Spain. We had honored our commitments, but they honored none of theirs, in that they issued not one weapon, nor did they take any preemptive action against the fascist military plot.”

[22] See the exchange between Companys and Escofet in the wake of the crushing of the fascists’ rebellion: “Mr President” — I said to him — “I bring you official word that the rebellion has been completely defeated [ ... ]”
“Good, Escofet, very good” — the President replied — “But the situation is chaotic. Uncontrolled armed riffraff have invaded the streets and are committing all sorts of outrages. And anyway, the CNT, heavily armed, is master of the city. What can we do against them?”
“For the time being, we have all been swept along, including the CNT leaders themselves. The only solution, Mr President, is to contain the situation politically, without letting any of our respective authorities go by the board. If you, for your part, can succeed in that, I undertake to take charge of Barcelona whenever you order me so to do or when circumstances permit.” [Federico Escofet: De una derrota a una victoria : 6 de octubre de 1934–19 de julio de 1936 (Ed. Argos-Vergara, Barcelona, 1984, p. 352)]

[23] Garcia Oliver addresses many of these questions directly or indirectly in his account of the interview with Companys: “The military-fascist uprising had come just as we had predicted. Companys retreated into the Police Headquarters in Barcelona, where I saw him at, it must have been, seven in the morning on July 19, terrified of the consequences of what he could see coming, in that he anticipated that, once all of the troop regiments in Barcelona had revolted, they would easily sweep aside all resistance. However, almost single-handedly, the CNT-FAI forces held out for those two memorable days, and after an epic and bitter struggle [...] we defeated all the regiments [...] For all these reasons, Companys was bewildered and shocked to find the CNT-FAI’s representatives before him. Bewildered because all he could think about was the heavy responsibility he had with regard to us and the Spanish people because of his failure to heed all our forecasts. [...] Shocked, because although they had not honored the commitments they had given us, the CNT-FAI in Barcelona and in Catalonia had beaten the rebels [...] So, when he sent for us, Companys told us: “I know that you have lots of grounds for complaint and annoyance where I am concerned. I have opposed you greatly and failed to appreciate you for what you are. However, it is never too late for an honest apology and mine, which I am now going to offer you, is tantamount to a confession: had I appreciated your worth, maybe the circumstances now would be different; but it is too late for that now, and you alone have defeated the rebel military and in all logic you ought to govern. If that is your view, I gladly surrender the Generalidad Presidency to you, and, if you think that I can be of any assistance elsewhere, you need only tell me the place I should take up. But if, since we do not yet know for sure who has had the victory elsewhere in Spain, you believe that I may still be of service in acting as Catalonia’s lawful representative from the Generalidad presidency, say so, and from there, and always with your agreement, we shall carry on this fight until it becomes clear who are the winners.” For our part, and this was the CNT-FAI’s view, we held that Companys should stay on as head of the Generalidad, precisely because we had not taken to the streets to fight specifically for the social revolution, but rather to defend ourselves against the fascist mutiny.” [From Garcia Oliver’s 1950 answers to Bolloten’s questionnaire, on deposit at the Hoover Institution.]
Garcia Oliver’s testimony deserves to be set alongside that of Federica Montseny: “In no one’s wildest imaginings, not even those of Garcia Oliver, the most Bolshevik of us all, did the idea of taking revolutionary power arise. It was later, when the scale of the upheaval and the people’s initiatives became plain, that there began to be debate about whether or not we should go for broke.” [Abel Paz: Durruti: El proletariado en armas (Bruguera, Barcelona, 1978, pp. 381–382)]

[24] Among the most interesting of these are the anarchist Abel Paz (Durruti: El proletariado en armas), the Civil Guard Francisco Lacruz (El alzamiento, la revolución y el terror en Barcelona), the book, cited above, by Escofet, the Generalidad’s commissar for public order, and the memoirs of Abad de Santillán and Garcia Oliver. As for standard texts, we simply cannot fail to mention Burnett Bolloten La Guerra civil española: Revolución y contrarrevolución (Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1989) and Pierre Broue Staline et la revolution. Le cas espagnol (Fayard, Paris, 1993).

[25] And which are of course the expression of a given political viewpoint, which may or may not be shared, but which we set out plainly here for what it is, without pretending to or invoking any nonexistent, hackneyed academic objectivity.

[26] And the People’s Executive Committee in Valencia or the Defense Committee in Madrid.

[27] See Balius’s arguments: “the establishment of committees of workers, peasants, militians and sailors was an instantaneous reaction to the destruction of the capitalist machinery of coercion. There was not a single factory, working class district, village, militias battalion or vessel where a committee was not set up. The committee was the ultimate authority, whose ordinances and agreements had to be abided by. Its justice, revolutionary justice, to the exclusion of every other (...) the only law was the imperious requirements of the revolution. Most of the committees were democratically elected by the workers, militians, sailors and peasants, regardless of denomination, thereby representing proletarian democracy, superseding a treacherous bourgeois parliamentary democracy. In short, there was but one power in the workplace: labor and the workers.
Generally, expropriation of the bourgeoisie and landowners was carried out as the committees were established (...) there was a similar transfer of powers with regard to arms. (...) Militias were set up (...) Control patrols were founded to see to the maintenance of the nascent, new revolutionary order (...)
The Spanish proletariat’s answer (...) was highly categorical and intelligent. The reaction had been crushed on the streets and expropriated economically, and the proletariat set itself up as the country’s arbiter (...)”
(Jaime Balius “Recordando julio de 1936” in Le Combat syndicaliste of April 1, 1971) [This article by Balius lifts whole sentences, word for word, from pages 292–294 of G. Munis’s book Jalones de derrota, promesa de victoria (Zero, Bilbao, 1977)]

[28] See, for instance, the sharp and radical alternative posited by Garcia Oliver: “Between social revolution and the Militias’ Committee, the Organization plumped for the Militias Committee.” (Juan Garcia Oliver El eco de los pasos Ruedo Ibérico, Paris-Barcelona, 1978, p. 188)

[29] Munis contends that after the July events all that remained was the governing power of the committees: “If the situation in the weeks following July 19 is to be characterized more precisely, it has to be defined as power diffused into the hands of the proletariat and the peasants. These were fully cognizant of their local power, although they lacked appreciation of the need to coordinate their power across the country. For its part, during those first weeks, the bourgeois Government lacked the capacity and will to combat the nascent workers’ power. There can be no talk of duality until later, when the Popular Front government came to, realized that it had survived, marshaled around itself whatever armed forces it could muster and set about contesting power with the committees of the proletariat and peasants.” (G. Munis “Significado histórico del 19 de julio” in Contra la corriente No. 6, Mexico, August 1943.)
We shall not here enter into analysis of the dual power thesis advanced by Munis for the period following July 19, 1936, which is to say, for the period between early October 1936 and May 1937. The difference between the position of the Italian Fraction and Munis’s position resides in the fact that the Bordiguists reckoned that, in the absence of utter destruction of the capitalist State, there can be no talk of revolution, whereas Munis took the line that the bourgeois State had been momentarily eclipsed. We simply point out the discrepancy and shall delve no further into the issue. What we are concerned to indicate here is the role played by the CAMC as a class collaborationist agency.

[30] This has been explicitly stated by, among others, figures as prominent and simultaneously so politically divergent as Garcia Oliver, Nin, Tarradellas, Azaña and Balius himself. See especially Nin’s article “El problema de los órganos de poder en la revolución espanola,” published in French in Juillet. Rvue internationale du POUM No. 1, Barcelona-Paris, June 1937.

[31] See Juan Garcia Oliver El movimiento libertario en España (2) Colección de Historia Oral. Fundación Salvador Segui, Madrid, undated.

[32] See the detailed description offered by Abel Paz: Viaje al pasado (1936–1939) (Ed. del Autor, Barcelona, 1995, pp. 63–64):
The Defense Committees which, with the army coup attempt, had turned into Revolutionary Committees, once the Central Antifascist Militias Committee of Catalonia had been launched, had ignored the latter’s authority and their activities had led to a local orchestration, based in the Casa CNT-FAI itself, making these committees a power within the power of the CNT-FAI higher committees; but they were a real power, greater even than the power of the higher committees. Each district committee had its own defense groups at its disposal. Groups comprised an indeterminate membership that could oscillate between six and ten. Every one of these comrades had a rifle and even a pistol kept permanently in his care. The Clot district, where I operated, boasted 15 defense groups, which, at a conservative estimate, meant around a hundred rifles. But to this strength must be added the factory groups, with their roots in the Clot district; these too had their own defense groups with their own weapons, up to and including machine-guns. Finally, the Libertarian Youth groups and anarchist groups also had to be included. This motley assortment was the material with which our district’s Defense Committee had to work.

[33] See, for instance, Garcia Oliver’s threatening and contemptuous snubbing of Companys when the latter called at the CACM headquarters on July 25^th to register a protest at the civil disorder and the activities of uncontrollables, in Juan Garcia Oliver El Eco de los Pasos op. cit. pp. 193–194.

[34] As spelled out in the thesis on the nature of the revolution and the Spanish civil war set out in Chapter 2 of this edition (No. 3) of Balance. See also No. 1 of Balance, which examines the theses of the Italian Fraction (Bordiguists) on the Spanish civil war.

[35] See the defamatory remarks about the Catalan anarchist movement and the allegations made against Jaime Balius or Antonio Martin, who are depicted as savage ogres by H. Raguer, J.M. Solé and J. Villarroya, who espouse a “neutrality” which is bourgeois, sanctimonious and Catalanist. See, for instance, the utterly extravagant accusations, dissevered from the context of a revolutionary situation proper, leveled at Balius on pages 256–258 of the book by the Benedictine friar H. Raguer Divendres de passió . Vida i mort de Carrasco i Formiguera (Pub. Abadia Montserrat, Barcelona, 1984) and on pages 67 and 68 of La repressió a la reraguarda de Catalunya (1936–1939) (Pub. Abadia Montserrat, Barcelona, 1989) by J.M. Solé Sabate and J. Villarroya Font. Also worth mentioning is a little volume offering a Catalanist version of the anarchist government of Cerdañia, which involved complete anarchist control of the border with France, and of the bloody incidents in Belver, (a direct precedent of the May Events in Barcelona), following which the Generalidad government managed to capture absolute control in that border region. See J. Pons i Porta and J.M. Solé i Sabate Anarquia i Republica a la Cerdanya (1936–1939) El “Cojo de Málaga” i els fets de Bellver (Pub. Abadia Montserrat, Barcelona, 1991). It has to be stressed that all of these books have been published by the publishing house of the Montserrat Monastery, which of course suggests plain ideological servility, which we refuse to accept as valid in any “objective” evaluation of Jaime Balius and Antonio Martin, much less their constant delirium, defamation and prejudices with regard to the libertarian movement.
See too the nonsense and outrageous remarks about Balius, and the derogatory remarks about the libertarian movement, uttered from a pedantic, academic perspective, incapable of comprehending the meaning in the 1930s of an action group, a trade union, a workers’ atheneum or a general strike, in the article “Grupos de afinidad, disciplina belica y periodismo libertario, 1936–1938” by Susana Tavera and Enric Ucelay da Cal, in História Contemporánea No. 9, (Servicio Ed. Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1993)
By contrast, well worth reading are Josep Eduard Adsuar’s interesting and illuminating articles on the libertarian movement. See, for example, “El Comitè Central de Milicies Antifeixistes” in L’Avenç No. 14 (March 1979), “La fascinación del poder: Diego Abad de Santillán en el ojo del huracán” in Anthropos No. 138 (November 1992). Very interesting too are articles by Anna Monjo and Carme Vega in the review Historia Oral No. 3, (1990): “Clase obrera y guerra civil” and “Socialización y Hechos de Mayo,” and, of course, Els treballadors i la guerre civil. Historia d’una indústria catalana colectivitzada by Anna Monjo and Carme Vega ((Empuries, Barcelona, 1986)

[36] On the Iron Column, see Abel Paz’s splendid study Crònica de la Columna de Ferro (Hacer, Barcelona, 1984). As early as September and October 1936, the Iron Column had figured in sensational incidents concerned with cleansing the rearguard (Valencia city), traveling there from the front lines in order to demand the disarmament and disbanding of armed corps in the service of the State and the dispatching of their members to front-line service. Repudiation of militarization of the militias was debated inside the Iron Column as it was in every other confederal column. In the end, the Column’s assembly gave its approval to militarization, since it would otherwise be denied weapons, pay and provisions. Then again, in the event of its being disbanded, there was a danger that the militians might enlist into other, already militarized units.

[37] Frank Mintz La autogestión en la España revolucionaria (La Piqueta, Madrid, 1977) pp. 295–308. Also Abel Paz, op. cit. pp. 275–294. And Paul Sharkey The Friends of Durruti: A Chronology (Editorial Crisol, Tokyo, May 1984).

[38] Jaime Balius, Pablo Ruiz and Francisco Pellicer were the leading organizers behind the meeting held by the Friends of Durruti in the Poliorama Theater on Sunday, April 19, 1937.

[39] See Jaime Balius’s interview with Pablo Ruiz in the newspaper La Noche No. 3545 (March 24, 1937): and El Amigo del Pueblo No. 5 (July 21, 1937): and Paul Sharkey, op. cit.

[40] “Ponencia que a la Asamblea del Sindicato presenta la sección de periodistas para que sea tomada en consideración y elevada al Pleno y pueda servir de controversia al informe que presente el director interino de Solidaridad Obrera,” dated Barcelona, February 21 and 22, 1937, on behalf of the Asamblea de la Sección de Periodistas. [Document on deposit with the Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona (AHMB).]

[41] See some of the new articles carried by Solidaridad Obrera, like “La ciudad de Barcelona” (August 18, 1936), “En el nuevo local del Comite de Milicias Antifascistas” (August 23, 1936), “Ha caido en el cumplimiento de su deber” (October 3, 1936), “Los galeotos de la retaguardia” (October 4, 1936), “Solidaridad con los caidos...” (October 9, 1936) or “Los pájaros de la revolución” (October 16, 1936).
See also, in the September and October 1936 editions of Solidaridad Obrera, articles similar to those of Balius, under the bylines of Mingo, Floreal Ocaña, Gilabert, etc.

[42] Balius’s regular column was headlined “Como en la guerra,” and, on occasion, the articles were not credited. Endériz, among others, also had a regular column.

[43] See some of the articles above Balius’s byline carried on the cover, like “No podemos olvidar. 6 de octubre” (October 6, 1936), “la revolución no ha de frenarse. El léxico de la prensa burguesa es de un sabor contrarevolucionario” (October 15, 1936), “Como en la guerra. En los frentes de combate no han de faltar prendas que son indispensables para sobrellevar la campaña de invierno” (October 16, 1936).

[44] We must not omit to highlight (whether or not it was written by Balius) the editorial carried anonymously by Solidaridad Obrera (October 11, 1936) under the headline “Ha de constituirse el Consejo Nacional de Defensa,” because of the way in which it was taken up later in El Amigo del Pueblo, as one of the most original points in the Friends of Durruti’s revolutionary program, to wit, the formation of a Revolutionary Junta or National Defense Council.

[45] See some of these articles of a political nature, in addition to those named above: “Ha de imponerse un tributo de guerra” (September 8, 1936), “Once de septiembre” (September 11, 1936), “Como en la guerra. Es de inmediata necesidad el racionamiento del consumo” (September 16, 1936), “Han triunfado las tacticas revolucionarias” (September 23, 1936), “Como en la guerra. La justicia ha de ser inflexible” (October 11, 1936), “Seamos conscientes. Por una moral revolucionaria” (October 18, 1936), “Problemas fundamentales de la revolución. La descentralización es la garantia que ha de recabar la clase trabajadora en defensa de la prerrogativas que se debaten en las lineas de fuego” (October 24, 1936), “Como en la guerra. Los agiotistas tienen pena de la vida” [an uncredited article which can be put down to Balius] (October 31, 1936), “Como en la guerra. La justicia ha de ser fulminante e intachable” [attributable to Balius] (November 1, 1936), “Como en la guerra. Se ha de establecer un control riguroso de la población” (November 3, 1936), “La cuestión catalana” (December 2, 1936), “El testamento de Durruti” (December 6, 1936) and “La revolución de julio ha de cellal el paso a los arribislas” (December 17, 1936).

[46] See the “Ponencia...” on deposit with the AHMB.

[47] See the “Ponencia...” on deposit with the AHMB.

[48] See Balius’s remarks on the replacement of Liberto Callejas by Jacinto Toryho as managing editor of Solidaridad Obrera, the CNT’s leading daily newspaper: “And I who served as editor [of Soli] alongside Alejandro Gilabert, Fontaura and others, ought to make it clear that a distinction has to be made between Soli under Liberto Callejas’s management and the Soli run by Jacinto Toryho. As long as Callejas was director the CNT’s July gains were at all times defended, and anarchist principles praised and propagated. But once Jacinto Toryho was imposed as director of Solidaridad Obrera, by the counterrevolutionaries ensconced in the committees, that is, by the cabal which has no goal other than to dispose of the authentic CNT, then not only was militarization championed, as F. Montseny implies, [but there was] something else. Day after day one could read in Soli about comrade Prieto and comrade Negrin. Let us come out with it all: men of dubious repute, like Canovas Cervantes and Leandro Blanco, former editor of El Debate, joined the editorial team at Soli. Life at Soli became impossible. I quit.” (Jaime Balius “Por los fueros de la verdad,” in Le Combat Syndicaliste of September 2, 1971.)
See also “Ponencia ...”

[49] Radio broadcast reprinted in Solidaridad Obrera (November 6,1936). That edition of Soli attributed the following words to Durruti: “If this militarization decreed by the Generalidad is intended to frighten us and force iron discipline upon us, they have made a mistake, and we invite those who devised the Decree to go to the front ... and then we will be able to make comparisons with the morale and discipline of the rearguard. Rest easy. On the front, there is no chaos, no indiscipline.”

[50] Balius’s most outstanding articles carried inIdeasare as follows: “La pequera burguesia es impotente para reconstruir España destruida por el fascismo” (No. 1, December 29, 1936), “La Revolución ha de seguir avanzando” (No. 3, January 14, 1937), “El fracaso de la democracia burguesa” (No. 4, January 21, 1937), “La Revolución exige un supremo esfuerzo” (No. 7, February 11, 1937), “Despues del 19 de julio” (No. 14, April 1, 1937) and “Hagamos la revolución” (No. 15, April 8, 1937).
No. 11 of Ideas(March 11, 1937) carries an unsigned article entitled “¡Destitución inmediata de Aiguadé!,” denouncing the counterrevolutionary activities of the Generalidad’s councilor for Security, two months ahead of the May events, over his theft of twelve tanks from the CNT through the use of forged documents, and over his systematic recruitment of monarchist and fascist personnel into the Generalidad’s Security Corps.

[51] Balius states: “It is intolerable that an individual without the slightest support in the workplace should attempt to lay claim to the Power which belongs to the working people alone. That of itself is enough to tell us that, had he a sizable body of men at his disposal, that same politician would once again place the working class in the capitalist harness. [...] For those guilty of the Revolution’s failure to sweep aside the enemies of the working class, we have to look to the workers’ ranks, to those who, for want of decisiveness in the early stages have allowed the counterrevolutionary forces to grow to such dimensions that it will be an expensive business to put them in their place.”

[52] Issue No. l ofIdeascarries the following list of the editors of and contributors to the “mouthpiece of the Bajo Llobregat Libertarian Movement”: Liberto Callejas (former director of Solidaridad Obrera), Evelio G. Fontaura, Floreal Ocaña, José Abella and Ginés Alonso, as editors. And Senén Félix as administrator. As contributors: Jaime Balius, Nieves Núñez, Elias Garcia, Severino Campos, José Peirats (director of Acracia in Lerida and future historian of the Spanish anarchist movement), Fraterno Alba, Dr. Amparo Poch, Ricardo Riccetti, Ramón Calopa, Luzbel Ruiz, Vicente Marcet, Manuel Viñuales, Antonio Ocaña, Tomás and Benjamin Cano Ruiz, Francisco Carreño (a member of the Durruti Column, its delegate to Moscow and a future leading militant of the Friends of Durruti), Antollio Vidal, Felipe Alaiz (a prominent anarchist theorist), Acracio Progreso, Manuel Pérez, José Alberola and Miguel Giménez. The cartoonists included Joaquin Cadena and E. Badia and Bonet.

[53] For Acracia of Lerida and its director, Peirats, it is interesting to consult the latter’s memoirs, especially for the stark description of the tremendous disappointment which the CNT-FAI’s collaboration with the government created in lots of anarchist militants. See José Peirats Valls “Memorias,” in Suplementos AnthroposNo. 18, Barcelona, January 1990.
In addition toIdeasin Hospilalet and Acracia in Lerida, the following were prominent anarcho-syndicalist opposition newspapers critical of the CNT’s collaborationism: Ciudad y Campo in Tortosa and Nosotros in Valencia. Mention should also be made of Ruta and Esfuerzo, organs of the Libertarian Youth of Catalonia.

[54] The notice in La Noche (March 2, 1937) states:
“At the instigation of a number of comrades of the anarchist Buenaventura Durruti who knew how to end his life with those same yearnings for liberation that marked his whole personal trajectory, it has been adjudged appropriate that a group should be launched to keep alive the memory of the man who, by dint of his integrity and courage, was the very symbol of the revolutionary era begun in mid-July. We invite all comrades who cherished Durruti while he was alive and who, after that giant’s death, have cherished the memory of that great warrior, to join the “Friends of Durruti.”
The “Friends of Durruti” is not just another club. Our intention is that the Spanish Revolution should be filled with our Durruti’s revolutionary spirit. The Friends of Durruti remain faithful to the last words uttered by our comrade in the very heart of Barcelona in denunciation of the work of the counterrevolution, tracing, with a manly hand, the route that we must take.
To enroll in our association, you must be a CNT member and furnish evidence of a record of struggle and of love forIdeasand for the revolution. For the time being, applications are being received at Rambla de Cataluña, 15, principal, (CNT Journalists’ branch) between five and seven in the evening. —
The steering commission —

[55] Articles in La Noche bearing Mingo’s signature are “Nuestra labor. La Revolución ha de seguir avallzando” (April 2, 1937), “Al pueblo se le ha de hablar claro”(April 8, 1937), “La Revolución exige una labor depuradora” (April 9, 1937) and “Una labor revolucionaria. La revalorización de los Municipios” (April 13, 1937).

[56] Mingo: “Una labor revolucionaria. La revalorización de los Municipios,” in La Noche (April 13, 1937).

[57] The pamphlet [which we have not been able to consult] jointly credited to Jaime Balius and Pablo Ruiz is entitled Figols, 8 de enero, 8 de diciembre, y Octubre and was published by Editorial Renacer.

[58] Although undated, these pamphlets by Balius came after October 1934 and before July 1936, and in order of publication they were: Jaime Balius De Jaca a Octubre Editorial Renacer, [Barcelona] undated; Jaime Balius Octubre catalan Editorial Renacer,[Barcelona] undated; and, Jaime Balius El nacionalisrno y el proletariado Editorial Renacer, [Barcelona] undated.

[59] As Balius stated in his letter of June 1, 1978 to Paul Sharkey: “I belonged to the FAI’s Renacer group along with comrades Pablo Ruiz, Francisco Pellicer, since deceased and Bruno Lladó, likewise deceased.” [Letter made available by Paul Sharkey, whom we thank for this information.]

[60] We can find a detailed description of the Gelsa militians and their opposition to militarization, which was closely connected with the launch of the Friends of Durruti, in the interview with Pablo Ruiz in La Noche Año XIV, No. 3545, of March 24, 1937.
See also the claims made by Balius himself: “The Friends of Durruti Group has its origins in the opposition to militarization. It was the Gelsa Militians Group that relocated en masse to Barcelona. At the head of the Gelsa Group was comrade Eduardo Cervero. So, in the Catalan rearguard, there was a considerable number of comrades from the Aragon front around, sharing the opinion that there was no way that the libertarian spirit of the militias could be abjured. Lest we embark upon an interminable list of comrades who moved to the Catalan capital with arms and baggage, allow me to recall, with great affection, Progreso Ródenas, Pablo Ruiz, Marcelino Benedicto and others. It was agreed that a group should be set up in Barcelona, and it was determined that it would be under the egis of the symbol of Buenaventura Durruti. Other members of the Durruti Group included comrades Alejandro Gilabert, Francisco Carreño, Máximo Franco, the delegate from the Rojinegra Division, Ponzán, Santana Calero, and lots of others.” (Jaime Balius “Por los fueros de la verdad” in Le Combat syndicaliste of September 2, 1971).
With regard to the number of militians from the Gelsa Group who, having repudiated militarization, decided to quit the front, taking their weapons with them, Pablo Ruiz is a lot more statistically precise, and probably a lot nearer the mark. “[After taking part in the storming of the Atarazanas barracks], I joined the Durruti Column, and I led the 4^th Gelsa Group, comprising over a thousand militians (...) whenever the Popular Army was foisted upon us from within (...) I resigned and rejoined the rearguard along with three decades of comrades. On that basis and at the instigation of comrade Balius, we founded the Friends of Durruti Group (...)” [Pablo Ruiz “Elogio póstumo de Jaime Balius” in Le Combat Syndicaliste/Solidaridad Obrera of January 22, 1981]

[61] The FAI was organized as a federation of affinity groups. During the civil war, prominence was achieved by affinity groups like “Nosotros” (which had previously gone under the name “Los Solidarios”), “Nervio,” “A,” “Z, “ “Los de Ayer y Los de Hoy,” “Faro,” etc.

[62] The newspaper La Noche on March 2, 1937 (page 6) carried the first report on the foundation of the Group, which was formally launched on March 17, 1937, according to this notice in the March 18,1937 edition of La Noche:
The ‘Friends of Durruti’ Group has been launched. A steering committee appointed. The meeting to launch the ‘Friends of Durruti’ was held last night.
The social premises — located on the first floor of 1, Ramblas de las Flores — were packed with people. Proceedings got underway on the stroke of ten o’clock. A panel was appointed to oversee the discussions. Several comrades from the front and from the rearguard took part in the discussion. Every one of the comrades who spoke reaffirmed his absolute support for the postulates of the CNT and FAI. There was broad discussion of the revolutionary course followed since July 19 and it was palpable that all of the assembled comrades wish the Revolution to press ahead. Certain counterrevolutionary maneuvers were lashed severely. [...]
In a disembodied way, our Durruti presided over the launch of the group. It was notable that there was no hint of idolatry, but rather a desire to carry out the wishes of our ill-fated comrade.
Next, the steering committee was appointed, along with a working party to draft the intentions by which the new group is to be informed. [...] The steering committee is made up as follows: secretary, Felix Martinez: vice-secretary, Jaime Balius: treasurer, José Paniagua: book-keeper, Antonio Puig Garreta: committee members, Francisco Carreño, Pablo Ruiz, Antonio Romero, Serafin Sobias, Eduardo Cervero. The working part comprises: Pablo Ruiz, J. Marin, Jaime Balius, Francisco Carreño and José Esplugas.
Before the proceedings were wound up, the gathering agreed by acclamation that a telegram should be sent to the CNT National Committee, demanding the release of comrade Maroto and of the comrades incarcerated in Valencia.

[63] Let us attempt to catalog all of the manifestoes, handbills, notices and posters signed by the Friends of Durruti Group, insofar as we know them. We shall not indicate place of publication because that is the city of Barcelona throughout. Virtually all of these documents can be found in the Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona (AHMB):
1. “Al pueblo trabajador” [Manifesto issued late March 1937. Double-sided handbill.]
2. “Al pueblo trabajador” [Manifesto opposing the commemoration of the anniversary of April 14.]
3. “¡Trabahadiers! Acudid el próximo dimingo, dia 18, al MITIN que la Agrupación Los Amigos de Durruti celebralá en el Teatro Poliorama” [Notice advertising the rally on April 18, 1937.]
4. “Agrupación de Los Amigos de Durruti. A la clase trabajadora.” [Poster pasted on walls and trees. Late April 1937.]. “ACTO organizado por la Agrupación Los Amigos de Durruti.
5. Domingo, 2 de mayo a las 10 de la mañana, en el TEATRO GOYA.” [Notice of the May 2, 1937 rally.].
6. “CNT-FAI. Agrupación ‘Los Amigos de Durruti’. ¡TRABAJADORES!” [Handbill distributed on the barricades on May 5, 1937.]
7. “CNT-FAI. Agrupacion ‘Los Amigos de Durruti’. Trabajadores.” [Manifesto distributed on May 8, 1937.]
8. “Trabajadores. Miércoles dia 19. Aparecerá el ‘Los Amigos de Durruti’. “ [Notice of the appearance of the first issue of El Amigo del Pueblo, scheduled for May 19, 1937.]
There are also some notices of lectures by Francisco Pellicer, sponsored by the CNT Foodstuffs Union, which we have not included.

[64] See Juan Andrade “CNT-POUM” in La Batalla of May 1, 1937. Reprinted in Juan Andrade La revolución espanola dia a dia (Ed. Nueva Era, Barcelona, 1979, p. 248.) The extract in which Andrade refers to the Friends of Durruti is this one:
For instance, the ‘Friends of Durruti’ have framed their program points in posters in every street in Barcelona. We are absolutely in agreement with the watchwords that the ‘Friends of Durruti’ have issued with regard to the current situation. This is a program we accept, and on the basis of which we are ready to come to whatever agreements they may put to us. There are two items in those watchwords which are also fundamental for us. All Power to the working class and democratic organs of the workers, peasants and combatants, as the expression of proletarian Power.

[65] Ruta, the mouthpiece of the Libertarian Youth of Catalonia, had been radically opposed to the CNT’s collaborationism since November 1936. Between March 1937 and late May 1937, it carried articles by Santana Calero (a member of the Libertarian Youth of Malaga), who was also a prominent contributor to El Amigo del Pueblo and a member of the Friends of Durruti. Issue No. 25 of Ruta, dated April 1, 1937, carried an article from the Friends of Durruti Group, entitled “Por el concepto anarquista de la revolución,” in which the same arguments are set out as in the late March handbill/manifesto: that the CNT-FAI had failed to impose itself on July 19 and agreed to collaborate as a minority player and afforded full scope to the petit-bourgeoisie: that the war and the revolution had to be one: “the war and the revolution are two aspects that cannot be dissevered. The War is the defense of the revolution”: that the unions should have the direction of the economy: that the army and public order should be under workers’ control: that arms had to be in the hands of workers only, by way of a guarantee of the revolution: that the petite bourgeoisie should man the fortifications battalions: that the rearguard should take the war to heart: that work should be compulsory and unionization obligatory, etc.

[66] This was Esfuerzo: Periódico mural de las Juventudes Libertarias de Cataluña. A weekly publication, comprising of one poster-sized page for posting on walls, it came out between the second week of March and the second week of May. Completely anonymous, it was made up, not of articles, but of watchwords, short manifestoes and appeals. It was a highly original wall newspaper. The following “articles” stand out: “El dilema: Fascismo o Revolución social” (in No. 1, second week of March 1937), “Consignas de la Juventud Revolucionaria” (No. 2, third week of March), “El Orden Público tiene su garantia en las Patrullas de Control...” (No. 3, fourth week of March), “Los ‘affaires’ por la substracción de 11 tanques. La provocación de Orden Publico en Reus, por Rodriguez Salas ...” and “A los ochos meses de revolución” (No. 4, first week of April 1937). The last issue of this wall newspaper, No. 9, is dated the second week of May 1937. Although the Friends of Durruti Group is never mentioned by name, its watchwords, vision and ideological content were very similar to those articulated and championed by the Friends of Durruti.

[67] ‘Friends of Durruti’ Group “Al pueblo trabajador” Barcelona [April 14, 1937]

[68] This meeting to introduce the Group was reported in detail by Rosalio Negrete and Hugo Oehler in a report written and date-lined in Barcelona the same day. That report was first published in Fourth International Volume 2, No. 12, (1937). See Revolutionary History Volume 1, No. 2, (1988), London, pp. 34–35.
The meeting had been called by means of handbills announcing that Francisco Pellicer would speak on the problelm of subsistence, Pablo Ruiz on the revolutionary army, Jaime Balius on the war and the revolution, Francisco Carreño on trade union unity and political collaboration, and V. Perez Combina on public order and the present time.
The following notice was carried in the daily newspaper La Noche (19 April 1937) about the progress of the meeting:
Yesterday morning, in the Poliorama Theater, a meeting was held by the Friends of Durruti Group. There was a considerable attendance and the meeting was chaired by comrade Romero, who, after a few short remarks outlining the meaning of the meeting, called upon Francisco Pellicer, who opened with a recollection of Durruti.
Next, attention turned to the problem of subsistence, and he stated that it was impossible to eat on current rates of pay [...] Pablo Ruiz spoke on the revolutionary army [...] Then Jaime Balius read some jottings [...] in which he reviewed the initial fighting against fascism on July 19 [...] He stated that the Revolution should go hand in hand with the war and that both have to be won. [...] Francisco Carreño spoke last on the topic ‘trade union unity and political collaboration’ [...] He, like the rest of the speakers, was very warmly applauded.

[69] Acta de la sessió consistorial del 22-5-1937 del Ajuntamente de Sabadell, Archivo Histórico de Sabadell. On page 399 of the book of minutes No. 16, the poster from the Friends of Durruti, issued in April 1937, is reproduced in full. This poster, which council member Bruno Lladó (who was also the comarcal delegate of the Generalidad’s department of economy [headed by Diego Abad de Santillán]) had put up in his office on Sunday, May 2^nd, joined the book of evidence against him when the councilor was accused of inciting rebellion against the Generalidad government in the course of the events of May in Barcelona.
The text of this poster, according to the minutes of the May 22, 1937 sitting of Sabadell Council was reprinted in Andreu Castells: Sabadell, informe de l’oposició. Annex per a la história de Sabadell (Vol. V) Guerra i revolucio (1936–1939) (Ed. Riutort, Sabadell, 1982, p. 22.8)

[70] The definition of the Revolutionary Junta offered by the Friends of Durruti was not always the same, as we shall see anon. But the significance of the watchwords in the April poster eluded no one. Establishment of a Revolutionary Junta implied not only the winding up of the bourgeois Generalidad government, but the introduction of dictatorship of the proletariat: “all power to the working class” and “all economic power to the unions.” In an interview granted to Lutte Ouvriere in 1939, Munis took the line that the terms “revolutionary junta” and “soviets,” as used by the Friends of Durruti, were synonymous.

[71] Balius was very conscious of the importance of the watchwords set out in the April 1937 poster. “May 1 1937 is the Spanish Kronstadt. In Catalonia, uprising was feasible only by virtue of the CNT’s might. And just as, in Russia, the sailors and workers of Kronstadt arose to a cry of “All power to the soviets,” so the Friends of Durruti Group called for “All power to the unions,” and we did so publicly in the many posters stuck up all over the city of Barcelona and in the manifesto we issued and managed to print up while the battle raged.” (Jaime Balius “Por los fueros de la verdad” in Le combat Syndicaliste of September 2, 1971)
See also Munis’s comments in La Voz Leninista No. 2 of August 23, 1937.

[72] Juan Andrade “CNT-POUM” in La Batalla of May 1, 1937. See also G. Munis “La Junta Revolucionaria y los ‘Amigos de Durruti”’ in La Voz Leninista No. 2, of August 23, 1937.

[73] Information about the May events has been taken from the following sources:
J. Arquer Les Jornades de maig Unpublished manuscript deposited with the AHN in Madrid Burnett Bolloten La Guerra civil española: Revolución y contrarrevolución (Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1989, pp. 659–704) [English language readers should see Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, Chapel Hill, 1979]
Luis Companys “This is a carbon copy of notes made by President ... and of teletyped conversations between various political figures during the fighting in Barcelona, May 3–7, 1937” [Deposited with the Hoover Institution]
Manuel Cruells Mayo sangriento. Barcelona 1937 (Ed. Juventud, Barcelona, 1970)
Francisco Lacruz El alzamiento, la revolución y el terror en Barcelona (Libreria Arysel, Barcelona, 1943)
Frank Mintz and Manuel Peciña Los Amigos de Durruti, los trotsquistas y los sucesos de mayo (Campo Abierto, Madrid, 1978)
Andres Nin “El problema de los órganos de poder en la revolución española.” Published in French in No. 1 of Juillet. Revue internationale du POUM in June 1937. Available in a Spanish translation in Balance No. 2 (March 1994)
Hugo Oehler Barricades in Barcelona (1937). Reprinted in Revolutionary History No. 2, (1988) pp. 22–29
George Orwell “Yo fui tesligo en Barcelona” in Boletin de información sobre el proceso politico contra el POUM No. 5, Barcelona, December 15, 1937
[Agustin Souchy] Los sucesos en Barcelona, Relación documental de las trágicas jornadas de la 1a de semana Mayo de 1937 (Ediciones Españolas Ebro, no place indicated, 3^rd edition August 1937)
Pavel and Clara Thalmann Combats pur la liberté. Moscou, Madrid, Paris (Spartacus, Paris, 1983)
Various Los sucesos de mayo de 1937. ona revolución en la Republica (Fundació Andreu Nin, Barcelona 1988)
Various Sucesos de mayo (1937) Cuadernos de la guerra civil No. 1, (Fundación Salvador Segui, Madrid, 1987)

[74] Jordi Arquer Les jornades de maig Unpublished manuscript text deposited with the AHN in Madrid.

[75] The Councilor for defense was CNT member Francisco Isgleas, a faithful friend and supporter of Garcia Oliver, who, during the May events, played a very prominently “neutral” role, preventing CNT and POUM troops from taking a hand in the fighting. Miguel Caminal offers testimony from Rafael Vidiella, according to whom Companys ordered Artemi Aiguadé to take the Telephone Exchange, and this in the presence of several councilors and the CNT’s Domenech, who merely pointed out the possible consequences of such a move. [In Miguel Caminal Joan Comorera Vol. II, p. 120]

[76] See Arquer, op. cit. and a report in Solidaridad Obrera of May 2, 1937 of the Generalidad council’s having met on Saturday May 1.

[77] Yet Arquer (op. cit.) appears to believe that Aiguadé was acting off his own bat, without the knowledge of the panel. Be that as it may, it seems obvious that the Generalidad government had washed its hands of Tarradellas’s policy of compromise and collaboration and opted instead for the direct confrontation (as advocated by Companys) which had worked so well in Bellver de Cerdaña.

[78] See the observations of Manuel Cruells (Mayo sangriento. Barcelona 1937 Ed. Juventud, Barcelona 1970, pp. 55–56) on this point. Cruells was a journalist with the Diari de Barcelona at the time. As for the influence of Stalinists over Aiguadé or Rodriguez Salas, whether there was any or not strikes us as irrelevant given that collaboration that was obtained between Companys, Comorera and the Soviet consul in Barcelona. This view is also expressed by Agustin Souchy in Los sucesos de Barcelona. Relación ... op. cit. p. 13.

[79] Shortly after news broke of the armed clash inside the Telephone Exchange building: “In order to ensure that this incident would not lead to wider clashes, the Chief of Service at the Public Order Commissariat, Eroles, the general secretary of the ‘Control Patrols,’ Asens and Diaz, representing the Defense Committee, traveled to the Telephone Exchange to get the attackers to withdraw.
Rodriguez Salas consulted by telephone with Aiguadé, the Councilor for Internal Security, on whose orders he had acted, and the latter instructed him that under no circumstances was he to withdraw, but should hold the positions he had captured....
Along with some other anarchists, Valerio Mas showed up at the office of [...] Tarradellas, asking him to order the Assault Guards trying to occupy the Telephone Exchange to withdraw [...] Tarradellas, and later [...] Arlemio Aiguadé, on whom they also called, feigned surprise and claimed that they had not issued any instructions to the effect that the Telephone Exchange should be occupied.
-This is Rodriguez Salas acting on his own account — Aiguadé told them. — And I promise you that [...] I will issue the requisite “orders for peace to be restored.”
[From Francisco Lacruz El Alzamiento, la revolución y el terror en Barcelona (Libreria Arysel, Barcelona, 1943)]
Francisco Lacruz’s information was probably lifted from the pamphlet published anonymously by Agustin Souchy in 1937 which stated: “To ensure that this incident would not lead to wider clashes, the police chief Eroles, the Control Patrols’ general secretary Asens, and comrade Diaz, representing the Defense Committee, journeyed to the Telephone Exchange [...] Valerio Mas, along with some other comrades, spoke to the premier, Tarradellas and the councilor of the Interior, Aiguadé, to urge them to pull out the troops. [...] Tarradellas [...] and Aiguadé assured them that they knew nothing of what had happened at the Telephone Exchange. It was discovered later that Aiguadé himself had signed the order for it to be occupied.” [Los sucesos de Barcelona. Relación... op. cit. p. 12]

[80] See the claims of Julián Gorkin in “Reúnion du sous-secretariat international du POUM — 14 mai 1937”: “In point of fact the movement was entirely spontaneous. Of course, that very relative spontaneity ought to be explained: since July 19^th, Defense Committees, organized primarily by rank and file CNT and FAI personnel, had been formed pretty well everywhere in Barcelona and across Catalonia. For a time, these Committees were scarcely active, yet it can be said that it was they which mobilized the working class on May 3. They were the action groups behind the movement. We know that no general strike instructions went out from either of the two trade union associations.”

[81] Jordi Arquer Història de la fundació i actuació de la ‘Agrupació Amigos de Durruti’ Unpublished manuscript [Deposited with the Hoover Institution]

[82] Ibid.

[83] Jordi Arquer, op. cit. There can be no question but that Nin took an interest in the Friends of Durruti right from their launch, since as early as March 4, 1937, in La Batalla , Nin published an article fulsome in its praises for theIdeasmooted by Jaime Balius in an article printed in La Noche of March 2, 1937, in which he warned of the dangers of the counterrevolution’s steady progress in Catalonia.

[84] On May 3^rd, the CNT Regional Committee and the POUM’s Executive Committee met in the Casa CNT-FAI for talks about the situation. After lengthy and detailed analysis of the prospects for action on the part of the POUMists, Valerio Mas, on behalf of the CNT Regional Committee, thanked Nin, Andrade and Solano for a pleasant evening, reiterating several times that the debate and discussion had been highly interesting, and that they should do it again some time. But no agreement was reached or made. The shortsightedness and political ineptitude of the CNT personnel defied belief: they thought that it was enough that they should have bared their teeth, that the barricades had to come down now, because the Stalinists and Republicans, having tested the strength of the CNT, would not dare go beyond that. On making his way back to the Ramblas, and dodging the barricades, Andrade could not help repeating over and over to himself: “A pleasant evening! A pleasant evening!” [Oral evidence taken from Wilebaldo Solano, Barcelona June 16, 1994]
On the meeting between a POUM delegation made up of Nin, Andrade, Gorkin, Bonet and Solano and the CNT Regional Committee, and, more especially, with its secretary, Valerio Mas, see Wilebaldo Solano “La Juventud Comunista Iberica (POUM) en las jornadas de mayo de 1937 en Barcelona” in Ls sucesos de mayo de 1937, Una revolución en la Republica (Fundación Nin y Fundación Segui, Pandola Libros, Barcelona, 1988, pp. 158–160)

[85] Jordi Arquer, op. cit. See also Wilebaldo Solano, op. cit.

[86] Jordi Arquer, op. cit. See also La Batalla editorials in Nos. 235 (May 6, 1937) 236 (May 7, 1937) and 237 (May 8, 1937)

[87] According to the Thalmanns’ account. See Note 1 above.

[88] Wilebaldo Solano, op. cit. p. 164

[89] The Barcelona Local Committee (of the POUM) “Informe de la actuación del Comité local durante los dias de mayo que ésta presenta a discusión de las celulas de Barcelona,” Archivo Histórico Naciónal de Madrid.

[90] According to Balius’s own claims in his correspondence with Burnett Bolloten, distributing the handbill on the barricades cost several Group members their lives.
For the printing and distribution of the handbill, see Pavel and Clara Thalmann Combats pour la liberte. Moscou, Madrid, Paris (Spartacus, Paris, 1983, pp. 189–191)

[91] Josep Rebull’s answer No. 7 to a questionnaire put to him by Agustin Guillamón (Banyuls-sur-mer, December 16, 1985):
Question: Did Cell 72 attempt to establish contacts with other groups with an eye to creating a revolutionary front, that is to say, with the Friends of Durruti, the Libertarian Youth, Balius, Munis, or other segments of the POUM?
Josep Rebull: The only contact with the ‘Friends of Durruti’ came during the May events, but the numerical slightness of that group, which had no links with the rank and file, and the modest representativity of Cell 72 did not produce a practical agreement, such as we wished to suggest, that we issue a manifesto to the struggling workers.

[92] Balius slated in 1971: “on account of the ‘cease-fire’ order issued by the CNT’s ministers, we issued a manifesto describing the committees responsible for that order as ‘traitors and cowards.’ That manifesto was distributed throughout the Catalan capital by the members of the Group and by the Libertarian Youth [Jaime Balius “Por los fueros de la verdad” in Le Combat syndicaliste of September 2, 1971]

[93] Jordi Arquer, op. cit.

[94] See Juan Andrade Notas sobre la guerra civil (Actuación del POUM) (Ediciones Libertarias, Madrid, 1986, pp. 117–125)

[95] Because they puncture all the mythology, Andrade’s comments upon the Friends of Durruti are extremely interesting: “[...] we made contact with the ‘Friends of Durruti’, a group of which it has to be said that they did not amount to much, being a lightweight circle which had no intention of doing anything more than act as an opposition within the FAI, and was in no way disposed to engage in concerted action with ‘authoritarian marxists’ like us. I am making this point because an attempt has since been made to depict the ‘Friends of Durruti’ as a mightily representative organization, articulating the revolutionary consciousness of the CNT-FAI. In reality, they counted for nothing organizationally and were a monument of confusion in ideological terms: they had no very precise idea of what they wanted and what they loved was ultra-revolutionary talk with no political impact, provided always that they involved no commitment to action and did not breach FAI discipline. We did all that we could, in spite of everything, to come to some agreement on the situation, but I believe we only managed to jointly sign one of two manifestoes urging resistance, because they would not countenance anything more. Later the group vanished completely and found no public expression.” [in Juan Andrade, op. cit. 12]
In any event, Andrade’s claims are, to say the least, contradictory, since one is forced to wonder why the POUM bothered to have talks with the Friends of Durruti if they amounted to nothing and were nobodies. Then again, we have already pointed to the interest which Nin displayed in Balius’s stance and in the birth of the Friends of Durruti, from as early as March 1937. Similarly, there is no question but that Andrade of l986 contradicts the Andrade of 1937 who wrote the article “CNT-POUM” carried by La Batalla on May 1, 1936: see Chapter 5, note 5.

[96] As Balius himself was at pains to make clear, the Friends of Durruti were alone [only the Group and the Bolshevik-Leninist Section issued leaflets with revolutionary watchwords] in welcoming the street-fighting and they attempted to provide the spontaneous struggle of the workers during the events of May 1937 with a lead and revolutionary purpose: “In Espoir, Floreal Castillo states that Camillo Berneri was the leader of the opposition in May. This is wrong. Camillo Berneri published La Lutte de Classes [actually, it was the Italian language paper Guerra di classe,] but played no active role. It was the men from the Friends of Durruti who turned up the heat. It was the miners of Sallent who erected the barricade on the Ramblas at the junction with the Calle Hospital, beside our beloved Group’s headquarters.” [Jaime Balius “Por los fueros de la verdad” in Le Combat syndicaliste of September 2, 1971]
Balius’s testimony is corroborated by Jaume Miravithes: “The city — so far as I know — is occupied throughout by FAI personnel, especially by groups from the Friends of Durruti, and by relatively large numbers from the POUM.” [Jaume Miravithes Episodis de la guerra civil espanyola. Notes del meus arxius (2) (Pórtic, Barcelona, 1972, p. 144)]

[97] As Balius says in his article “Por los fueros de la verdad,” cited earlier, the barricade was built by miners from Sallent.

[98] See Pablo Ruiz “Elogio póstumo de Balius” in Le Combat syndicaliste/Solidaridad Obrera of January 9, 1981.

[99] In his article “Por los fueros de la verdad,” Balius has this to say: “Later came the ukase from the higher committees ordering our expulsion, but this was rejected by the rank and file in the trade union assemblies and at a plenum of FAI groups held in the Casa CNT-FAI.”

[100] The welcome and widespread sympathy won by the Friends of Durruti from the CNT membership are evident, not just in the powerlessness of the CNT committees and leadership to secure their expulsion, but also in the discontent and deliberation which led, following the May events, to the emergence of a conspiratorial structure within the libertarian organizations, which threw up documents entitled “Aportación a un proyecto de organización conspirativa” and “Informe respecto a la preparación de un golpe de Estado,” as published in the anthology Sucesos de mayo (1937) Cuadernos de la guerra civil No. 1, (Fundación Salvador Segui, Madrid, 1987)

[101] Issue No. 1 of El Amigo del Pueblo bears no date. The Group had distributed a notice announcing that El Amigo del Pueblo, the mouthpiece of the Friends of Durruti, would be appearing, on Wednesday May 19. Tavera and Ucelay mistakenly give the date of May 11, 1937, probably taken from the Manifesto reproduced on the second page of the first issue of El Amigo del Pueblo. Paul Sharkey gives the much more likely date of May 20. Then again, given the weekly periodicity which it was intended the paper should have, and that issue No. 2 of El Amigo del Pueblo was published on May 26, 1937, there can be no doubt of the date on which No. 1 appeared.

[102] Solidaridad Obrera was under the management of Jacinto Toryho, who was appointed editor-in-chief of the CNT’s main newspaper on account of his resolute defense of CNT collaborationism and discipline. He was profoundly at loggerheads with Balius, who had always been highly critical of anarcho-syndicalist collaborationism. Regarding Toryho and his enmity and friction with Balius, see the interesting study made in an otherwise deplorable article by Susana Tavera and Enric Ucelay da Cal, cited earlier: as well as Jordi Sabater’s book Anarquisme i catalanisme. La CNT i el fet naciónal catalá durant la Guerra Civil (Edicións 62, Barcelona, 1986, pp. 109–110)

[103] As stated by Balius in his letter to Burnett Bolloten from Cuernavaca, June 24, 1946.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Jordi Arquer Història ... op. cit. Colonel Burillo had been involved in the arrest of Nin and the rest of the POUM leadership.

[106] In fact, on June 16, four days after the date on which No. 3 of El Amigo del Pueblo came out, the POUM was outlawed and its militants and leaders arrested and/or murdered, in an operation, unprecedented in Spain, overseen by the CPU and Spanish Stalinists.

[107] We need not, we feel, go into the differences between revolutionary marxism and Stalinism. Anyone interested in this matter can refer to issue No. l of Balance.

[108] So, the Friends of Durruti did not regard the Antifascist Militias’ Committee (CAMC) as dual power in embryo, but rather as a class collaboration agency. This was the same conclusion to which Nin, Azaña, Tarradellas, the Bordiguists, etc. had come and flies in the face of the academic, historiographical thesis presenting the CAMC as embryonic workers’ power in contradistinction to the Generalidad.

[109] In the indictment drawn up in February-March 1938 against the militants of the Bolshevik-Leninist Section, there is reference to a search carried out at the print works of one of those indicted, the printer Baldomero Palau. The search carried out at the print works in Barcelona’s Calle Salmeron uncovered a masthead for La Voz Leninista, used in the printing of No. 3, dated February 15, 1938. The document also mentions the discovery of two mastheads from the newspaper El Amigo del Pueblo. This was No. 12 of El Amigo del Pueblo, published in Barcelona on February 1, 1938.
Moreover, in Circular No. 4 from the Regional Labor Confederation (CNT) of Catalonia [held at the International Institute for Social history in Amsterdam], there is a reproduction of a circular issued by the Friends of Durruti (date unknown, but we imagine from August 1937) to all CNT unions in Catalonia, requesting financial assistance in the purchase of a copying machine because “it is becoming increasingly harder to get out El Amigo del Pueblo. Printers fight shy of agreeing to typeset and print it, on account of its clandestine status and for fear of the authorities. The day will come when we will no longer be able to get it out, because of this problem.”

[110] This was doubtless a printing error. The date should be August 31, 1937, since No. 8 is dated September 21 and there are only 30 days in September.

[111] As he himself tells us, Balius had been jailed in May 1937: “I was held on the first gallery of the Model Prison. This was in May 1937, after the May events.” [ Jaime Balius “No es hora de confusionismos” in Le Combat Syndicaliste of April 14, 1971]. However, the first report of Balius having been jailed appeared in issue No. 4 of El Amigo del Pueblo dated June 22, 1937. Given that issue No. 3 of the Friends of Durruti’s mouthpiece was dated June 12, 1937, the likelihood is that Balius’s incarceration coincided with the mass arrests of POUM militants, launched on June 16 when the POUM was declared outside the law.

[112] At no time do we enter into an examination of Durruti as a person, nor of his political ideology. We merely mention the claims of his contemporaries. It is not out of place to recall that Balius held that the Friends of Durruti Group, despite the name, had no ideological links with Durruti. Then again, Durruti was primarily an activist and was never a theorist, nor did he ever claim to be. We should point out also that Soli did not reprint Durruti’s broadcast speeches verbatim and unabridged.

[113] According to Arquer, op. cit., although the figure seems to us a bit inflated, if not incredible.

[114] On page 16 of the pamphlet Hacia una nueva revolución it is stated: “Sixteen months have past. What remains? Of the spirit or July, only a memory. Of the organisms of July, a yesterday.” From which our deduction is that the pamphlet was drafted around November 1937, which is to say, sixteen months after July 1936.

[115] In his 1978 introduction to the English-language edition of the pamphlet, Towards a Fresh Revolution, he says that it was published [he says “written” when he ought to have said “published”] in mid-1938: and he also explains the background to its publication:
“I shall now proceed with a short introduction to our pamphlet: Hacia una nueva revolución. First of all, when was it written? Around mid-1938. [...] Such was the tragic hour when we of the Friends of Durruti, at the Group’s last session, after prolonged examination of the disaster into which the counterrevolution had plunged us, and regardless of the scale of the disaster, refused to accept the finality of such defeat. The infamous policy pursued by Largo Caballero, whose government contained several anarchist militants, had eroded the revolutionary morale of the rearguard: and the Negrin government, the government of defeat and capitulation, gave the defeat hecatomb proportions. For this reason we decided to publish Hacia una nueva revolución which was, as we said, a message of hope and a determination to renew the fight against an international capitalism which had mobilized its gendarmes of the 1930s (in other words, its blackshirts and its brownshirts) to put down the Spanish working class at whose head marched the anarchists and the revolutionary rank and file of the CNT.
See the Friends of Durruti Group Towards a Fresh Revolution (New Anarchist Library (2) Translated by Paul Sharkey. Sanday, Orkney 1978).
However, in spite of what Balius claims in no. 12 of El Amigo del Pueblo there was a reference to the pamphlet, recently published by the Group and entitled Towards a Fresh Revolution. Since issue No. 12 of the Friends of Durruti’s mouthpiece is dated February 1, 1938, it can be stated that the pamphlet appeared in January 1938.

[116] We have consulted the pamphlet in the original, which differs slightly from the reprint by Etcétera, which is only 28 pages in length, although the text is full and complete.

[118] Note the distinction drawn by the Friends of Durruti between the “marxist” leaders (marxist meaning Stalinist counterrevolutionaries) and the exclusion of the POUM (POUMists as revolutionaries different from the Stalinists) from the united front.

[119] In 1971 Balius reiterated this view: “And I want to finish with the uprising of May 1937. The mistakes made could still have been set right. Again we had mastery of the streets. Two front-line divisions made for Barcelona, but the ‘cease-fire’ and the pressures and arguments brought to bear upon the commanders of the two divisions [the CNT’s Rojinegra division commanded by Maximo Franco (a Group member) and the POUM division under Josep Rovira: they were stopped thanks to the overtures by the CNT member Molina and the Defense councilor, the CNT’s Isgleas prevented them from reaching the Catalan capital. The counterrevolution’s day had come. The hesitancy in May did for the 20^th century’s proletarian epic.
Had we been able to call upon a capable revolutionary leadership, we would have made and consolidated a revolution that might have set an example for the world and would have put paid once and for all to the shabby Muscovite bogey” (Jaime Balius “Recordando julio de 1936” in Le Combat syndicaliste of April 1, 1971).

[120] And yet Balius had (in 1935?) published through the Editorial Renacer a pamphlet entitled El nacionalismo y el proletariado in which he set out, from an anarchist and workerist angle, very intriguingIdeason the matter of nationalism.

[121] See Benjamin Peret and G. Munis Los sindicatos contra la revolución (FOR, Apartado 5355, Barcelona, 1992). See also the appeal issued by the Bolshevik-Leninist Section of Spain on June 26, 1937 (ten days after the outlawing of the POUM) to the POUM left:
Instead of using a United Front to marshal the revolutionary anarchist masses against their anarcho-reformist leaders, your leadership blindly followed the CNT. This fact was most plainly demonstrated during the May events, when the POUM ordered a retreat before any concrete objective, such as the disarming of the security forces, had been achieved. During the events, the POUM was merely an appendage of the anarcho-reformist leadership.
The reverse side of this policy of support for the CNT bureaucracy has been the abandonment of the committees of workers, peasants and combatants which had sprung up spontaneously. So you are cut off from the masses. Your leaders concocted new theories under which the unions, those aged bureaucratic machines, could take power. You had done nothing to halt the dissolution of the local committees, while you were expelling our comrades for carrying out propaganda on the committees’ behalf. But during the May events you swiftly turned to the defense committees. This eleventh hour stance was of course utterly inadequate, for it is not enough to issue a hasty call for “committees”: they have to be organized in practical terms. But in fact, right after the May events your platonic solicitude for the committees ceased completely.
(Bolshevik-Leninist Section of Spain — (on behalf of the Fourth International) “El viejo POUM ha muerto: viva el POUM de la IV Internaciónal,” Barcelona June 26, 1937)